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8 April 1966

LOCATION, POPULATION, AND AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE POLICY

By

WILMER R. LOCHRIE

Lieutenant Colonel, Artillery U. S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE



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USAWC RESEARCH ELEMENT
(Research Paper)

Location, Population,
and
Australian Defense Policy

by

Lt Col Wilmer R. Lochrie
Artillery

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
SUMMARY	iii
CHAPTER 1. PROLOGUE.	1
2. SOME ASPECTS OF LOCATION.	6
Absolute location	6
The near North.	8
Ambivalence of Australia's location	10
Strategic considerations.	11
3. SOME ASPECTS OF POPULATION.	13
Size and distribution	13
Cultural affinity	14
White Australia	15
The effect of World War II.	17
4. THE WORLD WARS AND BETWEEN.	18
World War I	18
Peace conference and the mandates	19
Second thoughts	20
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance	21
The Washington Conference	23
The turn to the United States	24
5. THE POSTWAR PERIOD.	27
Lessons of World War II	27
Beginning the search.	27
ANZUS	29
SEATO	35
Capacity for independent action	37
6. EVOLUTION--ASSET OR LIABILITY TO THE US	41
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	51

SUMMARY

As a small or middle power with limited resources and geographically isolated, Australia has relied upon external assistance to protect herself against attack. Traditionally, this assistance came from the British. Traditionally, too, political and strategic decisions affecting security were made in London rather than Canberra. This remained true until World War II.

The unhappy events following the entry of Japan into World War II shattered the old concept that the strategic defense of Australia could be left to the British and the Royal Navy. By the end of the war, Australians had formed an appreciation of the immense strength that the United States was able to exert in Australia's area of primary strategic interest.

The experience of World War II caused the Australian Government to make a series of decisions which, while political in themselves, constituted the basis for the evolution of her defense policy. Australia placed her national survival above the previously acknowledged duty to sustain the military decisions taken by and in London. She openly sought the closest relations with the United States as the Pacific nation which possessed the power to insure her survival. Australia's postwar search for regional security arrangements was, in reality, generated by her determination to legalize and formalize a claim to United States military power as a substitute for that with which she had lived for a century. ANZUS and Australian membership in SEATO are two of the results.

Today, the United States is fully occupied in the Pacific with trying to contain Communist China, sustain South Vietnam, preserve the status quo of Laos, and to maintain the independence of Thailand. In light of these heavy US responsibilities, the Australian Government has apparently concluded that Australia may have to defend some vital interests which are not necessarily shared by her great ally, and that she may have to do so alone, at least until the progress of events compels US intervention.

As a result of the situation in the Pacific, Australia has embarked on a program to build up her military strength. When this buildup of military strength, sufficient to provide some capacity for independent action, is viewed in conjunction with a willingness to deploy those forces within an area of strategic importance to the US, the event can be fairly said to be of considerable importance to the US. This is especially true when the country concerned is, in the whole wide area from Bombay to Tokyo, the only state absolutely stable, resolutely western, and capable of providing a modern base for modern defense.

CHAPTER 1

PROLOGUE

There are certain broad assumptions as to ends and means which govern the defense policy of any country. Simply put, they are that the primary object of policy is security: physical security against external attack, the safeguarding of the national economic and social system, and the protection of a particular political structure against external pressures of a variety of kinds. Traditionally, these objectives have been realized by politico-military measures: the building up of sufficient military strength to avert attack, and the use of political means to create power alliances which would make more effective that military strength.

In these terms, many small and middle-sized countries have actively sought inclusion in a specific power bloc or have involuntarily been drawn into it as a result of geographic propinquity to a particular center of power. Collective security has been a long term traditional interest of defense ministries. In the early twentieth century this meant widely dispersed alliances. Since 1919, it has meant participation in a quasi-global organization like the League of Nations or the United Nations. Because of lack of effective power in such organizations, it has come increasingly to mean the formation of regional blocs under the umbrella of the United Nations' charter.

Regional threats to Australia's security attracted the attention of some Australians from the very first days of the colony's

existence. They were quick in fearing invasion across the Pacific or Indian Ocean. The identity of the invader changed with changing developments in the area. But, until shortly before federation, security and defense were popular topics only at dramatic moments when imperialism in the Pacific reached its peak between 1870 and the turn of the century. As a continuing concern, security was the preserve of a minority composed of officials, military professionals, and a few amateur strategists. They were responsible for the ideas and the pattern of action or, more often, nonaction in matters of Australian defense which remained characteristic almost until the outbreak of World War II.

Perhaps it is a bit surprising that the mass of Australians and frequently their governments were so little concerned about questions of security and defense considering the vastness of their country, the determination to keep out "undesirable" immigrants even at the risk of offending other peoples, and the frequent anxieties about the intentions of the "teeming millions" to the north. The explanation lies presumably in the intense preoccupation of the people with internal affairs; their political and military weakness on the international scene; their removal from Europe, the center of world affairs; and, above all, the widespread conviction that Australia's security was Britain's business, which indeed it was.

After the loss of the American colonies, there was a gradual reorientation of British ideas. The boon of self-government was freely bestowed throughout the empire. British policy with respect to self-governing areas is expressed in the following three statements:

(1) The British Government would remain solely responsible for foreign policy throughout the empire.¹

(2) The British Government would be responsible for the defense of the empire as a whole; this would take the form of naval defense.²

(3) It was contemplated that the colonies would supply products and would take in turn British manufactured goods.³

These policies led to Australia's complete reliance on the British navy and to the conclusion that, in many cases, danger of invasion could arise only as the result of conflict between a foreign power and Great Britain. Sensitivity in Australia to European developments led, therefore, occasionally to concern about the possibility of invasion as a secondary effect.

Often concern about invasion was caused by actual or potential foreign activities in the Pacific which could reasonably be interpreted as a direct threat to Australia without the intermediary of Great Britain. Within a few decades of Australia's establishment, such concern comprised not only the geographic area of Australia, but included the islands north and east of the continent. This concern was the genesis of the principle of the "safety region" or "fire screen" which has remained unchanged throughout Australia's

¹F. W. Eggleston, Reflections on Australian Foreign Policy, p. 2.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

history. It has been one of the few points which, when the region was threatened, could arouse a sizable section of the Australian public.⁴

In the closing decades of the nineteenth century the Australian colonies had repeatedly urged the British Government to annex New Guinea and the nearby islands in order to safeguard them against seizure by other powers; and, in 1883, when Germany established settlements on the northern coast of New Guinea, the Queensland Government, on its own initiative, planted the British flag on the southern shore, thereby claiming Papua for the Crown. This action gave Australia, for the first time, an international boundary other than the sea.⁵

Similarly, in the mid-nineteenth century, the individual colonies had taken action to exclude Chinese and other non-Europeans in the interests of racial purity and in defense of the "white man's standard of living". By the end of the century there was an almost universal demand for the imposition and enforcement of a strict "White Australia" policy as the first step in establishing a new nation. "The unity of Australia is nothing," said Alfred Deakin, the second Prime Minister, "if it does not imply a united race," and that, he said,

means not only that its members can intermarry and associate without degradation on either side, but

⁴Werner Levi, Australia's Outlook on Asia, p. 22.

⁵Ian Bevan, ed., The Sunburnt Country, p. 18.

. . . implies a people possessing the same general cast of character, tone of thought, the same constitutional training and traditions.⁶

The basic dilemma of Australia's defense policy and the genesis of the evolution of that policy has been and is her geographical location as a sparsely populated outpost on the rimland of Asia. The formulation of the principles of the "fire screen" and of a "White Australia" over a century ago marked the early recognition of this dilemma. The evolution of Australia's defense policy beginning with World War I and in response to the dilemma with which it was and is faced can be better understood after an examination of certain aspects of Australia's location and population.

⁶Ibid.

CHAPTER 2

SOME ASPECTS OF LOCATION

ABSOLUTE LOCATION

The world's only continent occupied by a single country, Australia is situated in the southern hemisphere between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It is southeast of the land mass of Asia. Almost 40 percent of the island continent is north of the Tropic of Capricorn.

Australia lies between east longitudes 113 degrees 9 minutes and 153 degrees 39 minutes and between south latitudes 10 degrees 41 minutes and 43 degrees 39 minutes. The land extremities are Steep Point (Western Australia), Cape Bryan (New South Wales), Cape York (Queensland), and South East Cape (Tasmania).¹

The isolation of Australia is fundamental: its nearest continental neighbor--and by far the nearest to the developed core in southeast Australia--is Antarctica. The continent is separated by twelve hundred miles of ocean from its nearest white neighbor, New Zealand; by forty-five hundred miles from South Africa. It is over twelve thousand miles from Sydney to Southampton via the Suez Canal, and over ninety-five hundred miles from Sydney to New York via the Panama Canal. Only to the northwest is there any proximity of alien land: the farthest outpost of Asia, Timor, lies five hundred miles

¹Australia, News and Information Bureau, Australian Official Handbook 1964, p. 7.

from Darwin. North and northeast, indeed, New Guinea is only one hundred miles from Cape York, New Caledonia within seven hundred miles of Queensland; but these islands are neither populous in themselves nor backed, as is Timor, by the millions of Indonesia. Beyond them lie thirty-three hundred miles of sea to Hawaii, and then a further twenty-four hundred miles to the west coast of the United States. Yet the United States is the nearest really powerful base of the Western world.

The isolation of Australia can be most clearly shown by reference to a map showing the hemisphere centered on Canberra. From this viewpoint, Europe and North America do not appear. Most of the hemisphere consists of the Pacific, Indian, and Arctic Oceans. The major land area to appear on the map is that portion of Asia east of a line linking Bombay to the southern tip of the Kamchatka peninsula.

Another fundamental growing from Australia's location is that it lies in a gigantic rain shadow. The greater part of Australia lies within the southern arid belt, one of two which encircle the world approximately between 15 and 35 degrees of latitude in each hemisphere. Within these zones are found the world's most famous deserts. In the case of Australia, about 70 percent has a rainfall of less than 20 inches per year; nearly 60 percent receives less than 15 inches per year; almost 40 percent receives less than 10 inches per year.² The situation is aggravated by an evaporation

²Australia, Bureau of Census and Statistics, Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 49, 1963, p. 47.

rate which actually exceeds the rainfall over about three-quarters of the continent, and which is at least double the rainfall over half the country.³

THE NEAR NORTH

Until 1939 Australia was concerned almost exclusively with its own internal progress and development. Its gaze was directed across the Pacific to North America with the Atlantic and Europe beyond, or across the Indian Ocean to the Middle East and Suez and the industrial markets of Europe. Scarcely a glance was cast to the near north and its billion and a half inhabitants. With a policy of exclusion--the White Australia policy--and with implicit trust in the ability of the United Kingdom to defend it, Australia was content to pursue its interests in a sense of false security.

World War I temporarily ruffled the surface of this complacent and traditional attitude. World War II, however, successfully destroyed the attitudes and outlooks of a century and a half. When the Japanese reached New Guinea, Australians realized that the continents of Asia and Australia were not widely separated and unrelated land masses. Australia is to Asia much as Africa is to Europe. The Mediterranean has its counterpart in Indonesia. Singapore and Manila are not unlike Gibraltar and Malta. The coast of the Northern Territory is the equivalent of Tunisia and Libya. The island-studded seas to the north of Australia are not

³Ibid., p. 45.

as effective a barrier as the breadth and aridity of Australia's desert and savannah lands, which may well be compared with the Sahara and the Sudan.

After 1941, Australians also came to see how little they knew about even the nearer islands to the north. These were obviously part of the safety zone or fire screen principle which was historic in Australian foreign policy. Yet, alone, she had not the military power to defend them. The war also demonstrated how distant London and Washington were in an emergency, and how vulnerable in modern warfare were the long sea communications across the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

The people of Australia also discovered something of the broad political, social, and economic problems of its near north. In monsoon Asia, between India and Manchuria, were hundreds of millions of people. Most of them had depressed living standards. Their technology was primitive. Their economy was largely one of simple subsistence.

The postwar period saw the crumbling of the old power structure and the development of a power vacuum in South and Southeast Asia. It saw too the complication of the changing balance of forces by the slow substitution of new and unstable nationalist governments, themselves undergoing a process of social revolution. The new Asian governments had a predilection for authoritarian rather than democratic rule, but the process of social revolution and industrialization tended to aggravate the struggle for political power within

the states to determine which of the competing political forms and philosophies would triumph.

No discussion of Australia's near north would be complete without specific reference to Indonesia. This is the only country with which Australia shares a land boundary. Its government is unstable; its economy is chaotic; it has been termed an aggressor by Australia with respect to its actions against Malaysia. It is subject to communist subversion. Thus, the islands which should form the bulk of Australia's safety area or fire screen are the ones which cause the most acute anxiety to Australia.

AMBIVALENCE OF AUSTRALIA'S LOCATION

Although the logic of Australia's geographic position is that she is fundamentally an Asian country because of her contiguity to other Asian countries, her position is really an ambivalent one because of her economic, political, and cultural ties with Western Europe and North America.

Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, has said, "From now until the end of time Australia lies in Asia."⁴ Professor R. H. Greenwood of Brisbane has said, "Australia is not part of Asia."⁵ These statements illustrate Australia's dilemma. Geographically, Australia is, and must continue to be, an

⁴Roger Hilsman, "Australia's Strategic Position," The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 50, 17 Feb. 1964, p. 245.

⁵Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper, ed., "The Commonwealth," Australia in World Affairs, 1950-55, p. 111.

outrider of Asia. Historically, Australia is an outpost of Western civilization. The cultural pull is to Oxford, Cambridge, and Harvard rather than to New Delhi, Tokyo, Djakarta, or Peking. Australian political experience and institutions are grounded on those of Great Britain rather than on the autocratic conditions of Asia. The lines of trade and capital investment are with the North Atlantic community rather than with South or East Asia. A dependent economy by choice and nature, Australia relies for a critical part of her national income on export markets in Europe and North America.

This ambivalence has faced Australia with a series of difficult choices between complex pulls and interests, and has forced a series of compromises to attain the chief goal of security.

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Geographically Australia is isolated. She is a large, under populated, semicontinental area on the rim of Asia, linked to Asia by an island archipelago. She occupies the eastern end of a land bridge resting on Malaysia. More than ten thousand miles from Western Europe, at the extreme end of the Commonwealth line of communication from London via Suez, she is geographically almost a part of Asia. Thousands of miles separate her from the United States.

Australia, in a sense, is like the United States in that she is a two ocean continent. The western approaches lie through the Indian Ocean which washes the whole of Western Australia and portions of the Northern Territory. While the Indian Ocean was

predominantly a British ocean, during the period when the approaches through Suez and the Red Sea and via the Cape of Good Hope were controlled by the United Kingdom, the problem of security in the area was relatively minor. The changed British status in Egypt and the Suez, and her withdrawal from India removed the shield of her protection from the top of Australia. The main line of communications with Europe, to defend which Australian troops fought in two wars in the Middle East, is more vulnerable than ever before. The Middle East is a focal point in the air communications between Australia and Europe. There are located the main oil reserves on which Australia relies. The chain of defense bases from London through Suez to Singapore is fragile and uncertain. British military power is very thin east of Aden.

Strategically, the crucial area for Australia is the Pacific. The increase in American defense power in the western Pacific has meant the substitution of American for British influence in the area. But the gap between the British and American defense lines ending in Singapore and Manila leaves an unsecured breach in what, in a sense, is the meeting ground of Eastern and Western interests in the area.

Unlike the Western powers, Australia cannot contract out of the Pacific or out of Southeast Asia; she is irretrievably tied to Asia. Her destiny is conditioned by it.

CHAPTER 3

SOME ASPECTS OF POPULATION

SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION

Australia is a relatively sparsely populated continent with a population estimated to be slightly over eleven million people as of November 1963.¹ This population is located in an area of approximately three million square miles.² This gives an overall population density of less than four persons per square mile. Large areas of the continent are too arid to sustain dense population, or, indeed, any population at all. Thirty-eight percent of the country has an annual rainfall of less than 10 inches. The remaining habitable area, which could be estimated at two million square miles, must still be regarded as being sparsely populated with a density, on the basis of eleven million people, of less than six persons per square mile.

The foregoing figures on population density, low as they are, can be misleading unless one is aware of one additional population factor. Based on the 1961 census, 83 percent of Australia's population lived in metropolitan areas.³ Further, based on estimated

¹Australia, News and Information Bureau, Australian Official Handbook 1964, p. 47.

²Ibid., p. 7.

³Australia, Bureau of Census and Statistics, Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 49, 1963, p. 309.

figures as of June 1963, over 60 percent of the population lived in the national capital and the seven state capitals.⁴

CULTURAL AFFINITY

This lightly populated continent is located on the fringe of Asia in such a way that within the compass of a circle of six thousand miles from Alice Springs, in the center, virtually the only inhabited land areas are those populated by Asians.

Some of the implications of these facts are widely recognized by Australians, who appreciate the vulnerability of their prosperous but lightly populated country located on the fringe of an area containing very high population densities and conditions of extreme poverty. Asia, in its struggle for development, does not have frontier territories that can be used as demographic safety valves.

The regional location of Australia with Asia suggests that, as an area of low population density, producing export agricultural surpluses, and with an expanding manufacturing industry, Australia could theoretically fulfill a frontier function for Asia.

However, the influence of Australia's century and a half of historical experience points in a different direction. Rather than fulfilling anything like a frontier function for Asia, Australia's dominant ties are with the West, particularly with Europe. This circumstance is a natural consequence of Australia's

⁴Australia, News and Information Bureau, op. cit., p. 47.

discovery and settlement by Europeans, particularly the British. Inevitably, therefore, Australia's population and culture are Western. Its affinities and sympathies lie with the West despite its geographical isolation from the West and geographical proximity to Asia.

WHITE AUSTRALIA

The ancestors of Australia's present population were drawn from Europe, especially the British Isles. Asian immigration has occurred in the past--the immigration of the Chinese during the gold rush period of the mid-nineteenth century⁵ and the Kanaka immigration to the Queensland sugar fields.⁶ Any consistent and continuing influx of Asians into Australia was, however, frustrated by the attitudes of the Australian population and the British immigrants, who were entering the country at the same time and for substantially the same reason as the Chinese. Conditioned in part by racial prejudice and in part by a real fear that their living standards might suffer as a consequence of any extensive immigration of Asian labor, both the British immigrants and Australian workers reacted sharply to the Chinese influx. As a result, the "White Australia" immigration policy was instituted and, although the name is currently unfashionable and not officially used, it remains the keystone of Australian population policy.

⁵Manning Clark, A Short History of Australia, p. 124.

⁶Ibid., p. 156.

The "White Australia" policy evolved during the latter half of the nineteenth century when, as a consequence of the gold rushes, a substantial Chinese immigration occurred. Although this influx left no permanent mark upon Australia's population, it was sufficiently extensive to produce race riots in the gold fields.⁷ It also convinced the Australians and the many new settlers of the danger to their living standards that might arise from any substantial influx of labor from Asia. This fear for living standards, reinforced by racial prejudice, resulted in the development of a determination to keep Australia "white". As a result, after the federation of 1901, the Federal Government received powers to deal with immigration. The first national parliament enacted the necessary legislation to put the "White Australia" policy into practice on a nationwide basis.⁸

It is evident that in population policy the basic attitudes of the Australians are conditioned more by their historic experience than by any factor of geographical association. All that geographical proximity has contributed to these attitudes is a special twist--the fear of a relatively small white population of being overwhelmed by its nonwhite neighbors and a determination to build a sufficiently large Western population as to be able to insure national survival.

⁷Ibid., p. 125.

⁸C. Hartley Grattan, Introducing Australia, p. 53.

THE EFFECT OF WORLD WAR II

Although Australians have been keenly aware of their potential vulnerability to Asia, they were equally conscious, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, of the protection afforded to them by British sea power. Hence, although conscious of the need to enlarge their population, the drive for population did not dominate all other issues and was, in fact, subordinate to the building of an effective system of social welfare.

The events of World War II altered this situation somewhat by eradicating any complacency Australians might have felt about the security provided by the British fleet. The events of 1940 clearly demonstrated that Britain was no longer capable of defending simultaneously herself in Europe and her dominions in the Pacific.

British inability to defend Australia from invasion by an aggressive Asian power revived, as no other event could have done, Australia's fears of being overwhelmed by alien peoples and cultures. One result was her postwar effort to replace the British bastion with the United States and her subsequent search for a regional collective security arrangement for her part of the world. Australia's postwar search for security had its genesis in the problem of under population as much as in its isolation from its major allies.

CHAPTER 4

THE WORLD WARS AND BETWEEN

WORLD WAR I

In the first World War the essence of Australia's defense policy was that since the Royal Navy would retain command of the seas and guarantee Australia's local security, she could afford to send almost her entire army to fight in Europe and the Middle East. This would repay the British for having borne the main burden of defense throughout the years of peace.

In the Pacific, early in the war, Australian troops took over the German portion of New Guinea and the associated islands south of the equator. It was also understood that Australian forces would go on and occupy German islands north of the equator as well. On November 24, 1914, London instructed the Australians not to proceed with this task.¹ Instead, it was undertaken by Japan.

Behind the scenes, the British and Japanese Governments agreed to make this occupation permanent. The Australian Government had been consulted on this step in 1915, 1916, and 1917. Reluctantly, it had agreed as a gesture of loyalty to the British Government:

The Commonwealth government will carefully abstain from doing or saying anything likely to strain or make difficult the relations between His Majesty's

¹C. Hartley Grattan, Introducing Australia, p. 231.

Government and Japan, either in regard to future partition of the Pacific or in regard to trade or in any other matter.²

In February 1917, Japan was told by the British Government that the British would support Japan's claim to Germany's rights in the islands north of the equator provided, at the peace settlement, Japan would so treat British claims to the German islands south of the equator.³

PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE MANDATES

When this arrangement became public knowledge, many Australians became restless. The belt of Pacific islands surrounding Australia had traditionally been considered an Australian preserve. Any foreign interference with them had always aroused resentment among the Australian people. The arrangement with Japan touched upon one of the few spots in international affairs on which a large number of Australians were sensitive. At the Peace Conference, Australia failed to displace the Japanese. She did succeed in sealing herself off from the Japanese by getting the former German islands south of the equator as Class C mandates.⁴

This arrangement did not satisfy large sections of the Australian public. While most Australians did not want to see the islands in foreign hands, they did not necessarily want their

²Werner Levi, Australia's Outlook on Asia, p. 38.

³C. Hartley Grattan, op. cit., p. 231.

⁴C. Hartley Grattan, The United States and the Southwest Pacific, p. 135.

country burdened with the responsibility for them. There was criticism of Australia getting involved in the administration of foreign territory when she did not have enough people to administer her own. Some people worried that ownership of the islands would bring Australia into military contact with Japan. Also, there was vague uncertainty on what the addition of colored people to Australian jurisdiction might do to the "White Australia" policy. How were the Asians to be prevented from immigrating to Australia? However, the essential idea behind the Class C mandate was that holders could make the territories integral parts of the home country in an administrative sense. It was thus made possible for Australia to substitute the closed for the open door with regard to trade and immigration in her mandates.

SECOND THOUGHTS

Australians did not seem too concerned about the many broader problems which confronted them as a result of the war. Most Australians wanted a quick return to normalcy and to continue to build a better life at home.

It was a small number of Australians who retained an interest in the relationships of their country with the Asian neighbors. There was a vague uneasiness among those paying attention to Asia about the coming end of white rule and the awakening of the Asian people. It occurred to a number of Australians that they were approaching a new situation with which they had to come to terms, and that this might not be easy because neither traditional

Australian attitudes toward Asians nor the past relationships of the country with the Asian environment had prepared them for the necessary adjustments. It was clear that this new situation could no longer be handled in a military way alone; the problem went beyond the relative weakening of British power due to the war. For the first time, a few Australians envisaged what became clear to many much later. Great Britain could withdraw from the Pacific when the situation became too complex, but Australia was irrevocably in the Pacific. The old idea of Australia as an outpost and the sense of loneliness in a foreign environment came to the fore again. With it came a disquietude that could not be laid to rest by an appeal for the protection of the British fleet.

Out of this cross current of opinion, provoked by the changing conditions in Asia, Australia had to shape a policy. This process began in the formulation of an Australian position on the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1921.

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was originally entered into by the British as a contribution to the stabilization and strengthening of their position on the continent of Asia and in the Far East.⁵ For about half a century before the alliance was arranged, Australians had viewed the countries of Asia almost exclusively as possible sources of unwanted immigrants. The Japanese were

⁵Ibid., p. 136.

considered to be the principal source.⁶ In this respect, many Australians were not sure that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, when it was first made, was altogether in their best interests. It was feared that the British, in their struggle with Asian problems, might conclude that Japanese friendship was of more importance than Australia's welfare and support the Japanese in an assault on "White Australia". On the other hand, when the alliance was renewed in 1911, the Australians were worried lest it might bring the Americans down on their heads in case of a Japanese-American conflict.

When the second renewal of the alliance was discussed at the Imperial Conference of 1921, Australia was the most forceful advocate of renewal.⁷ The Japanese pressure on the mandated islands of German Micronesia had brought them uncomfortably close to Australia. By the time of the conference, the Australians had worked themselves around to the position that the alliance put Britain in a very strong position to exert a moderating influence on Japan's policies. The alliance was, in this fashion, regarded as an integral part of Australia's security system. There were things it did not seem wise to do to retain American goodwill, valuable as it was. Abandoning the alliance was one of them. In the view of the Australian Prime Minister, William Hughes, it was

⁶Ibid.

⁷Werner Levi, op. cit., p. 42.

more important to restrain Japan than conciliate the United States.⁸

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

No decision was reached at the Imperial Conference with respect to the alliance. The problem was transferred, unsolved, to the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, 1921-1922. From this conference came several treaties, including a Four Power (United States, Britain, France, Japan) Treaty as a substitute for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.⁹

Overall, the conference left Japan the preponderant naval and military power in the Western Pacific. The United States was left as the preponderant power in the Eastern Pacific on a line running from Alaska to American Samoa and pivoted on Pearl Harbor. In the face of this division, the Southwest Pacific dominions came to found their defensive positions on the British base at Singapore.¹⁰

Australians expected a period of peace from the Washington Conference during which they could devote themselves fully to internal developments and foreign trade. This they did until 1931, when the Japanese initiated their aggressive policy against China. Australia became alarmed. The response from London was an assurance

⁸C. Hartley Grattan, The United States and the Southwest Pacific, p. 138.

⁹"Anglo-Japanese Alliance," Encyclopedia Americana, Vol. II, p. 686.

¹⁰"The Washington Conference," Encyclopedia Americana, Vol. 28, pp. 777-778.

that, in the event of any threat developing in the Pacific, a powerful naval force would be sent at once to the naval base at Singapore. From there it could safeguard the ocean approaches to Australia. At the Imperial Conference of 1937 this assurance was accepted with some misgivings, but the Australian Government nevertheless based its defense plans on the assumption that the British fleet would maintain command of the Southwest Pacific. Thus, provided Japan did not openly intervene in the event of a war between Germany and the Western Allies, Australia could again safely send an expeditionary force to Europe.¹¹

These assumptions were challenged by the leader of the Labour opposition (John Curtin) who argued, with strong support from some sections of Australian military opinion, that Japan would not attack until Britain was heavily engaged in Europe, and that it might then not be possible for a British fleet to reach Singapore in time to prevent its capture.¹²

THE TURN TO THE UNITED STATES

Curtin's foresight proved to be correct. In December 1941, when Japan attacked, there were only two British battleships at Singapore. Lacking air cover, they were promptly sunk.¹³ This

¹¹Ian Bevan, ed., "Australia's Expanding Horizon," The Sunburnt Country, p. 21.

¹²F. W. Eggleston, Reflections on Australian Foreign Policy, p. 7.

¹³Manning Clark, A Short History of Australia, p. 224.

disaster, coming on the heels of Pearl Harbor, opened the sea routes to Australia at a time when three of the four trained and equipped Australian divisions were in the Middle East. The other was trapped in Malaya.

Singapore fell. Any expectation that Japan could be delayed in the Philippines or the Indies was speedily dissipated. Old German New Guinea was occupied. Australia expected invasion.

Thus, Australia found herself where she had always feared to be--isolated from the well-spring of its security, Great Britain and the British fleet. Compounding this fearsome event was the spectre of the "Yellow Peril," always personified by Japan, sweeping down from the north to Australia's doorstep. Australia had again paid her premium for British protection and found--for whatever the reason--that protection was not forthcoming.

In the midst of these events, John Curtin, now Prime Minister, made a significant statement to the Australian people:

The Australian government regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the United States and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the democracies fighting plan.

Without inhibition of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links with the United Kingdom.

We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces. We know the constant danger of invasion. But we know too that Australia can go and Britain still hold on.

We are therefore determined that Australia shall not go, and we shall exert all our energies toward shaping a plan, with the United States as its

keystone, which will give our country some confidence of being able to hold out until the tide of battle swings against the enemy.¹⁴

¹⁴Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

THE POSTWAR PERIOD

LESSONS OF WORLD WAR II

World War II held two lessons for Australia. One was that geographical isolation was no defense and, indeed, was dangerous. An Asian power could attack Australian territory and threaten her with invasion. The other was that British power was not great enough in time of war in Europe to conduct an effective defensive war in the Far East. These were traumatic lessons for the Australians. They wished to keep their close ties with Britain in the very best of order for reasons of history, blood ties, culture, and economics. On the other hand, they recognized that Britain's power throughout the world, and especially in the Pacific, had sharply declined and was unlikely to recover to a level that would justify neglecting to develop a special relationship with the United States, now one of the world's superpowers, especially potent in the Pacific. Slowly, the Australians came around to the view that the apparent price of survival in the postwar world was to devise a scheme of relationships which would reconcile continuing the Commonwealth association in full force while developing a new relationship with the United States.

BEGINNING THE SEARCH

The chosen instrument for formalizing relations with the United States was announced by the Minister for External Affairs in March 1950:

It is therefore thought desirable that all governments who are directly interested in the preservation of peace throughout South and Southeast Asia and in the advancement of human welfare under the democratic system should consider immediately whether some form of regional pact for common defense is a practical possibility.¹

The Minister emphasized the importance of US membership by pointing out that such a pact would lack substance and be relatively meaningless without United States participation.²

The negotiation of a peace treaty with Japan provided the opportunity for Australia to make a beginning toward the kind of Pacific Pact envisioned in 1950. Because of other world developments, there was a trend in the United States toward a "soft" peace for Japan. Protection against the revival of Japanese militarism was the weakest argument for a Pacific Pact, at least in the short run. Nevertheless, it gave Australia considerable bargaining power because her nuisance value was great. The United States considered it important to have as many countries as possible sign the projected peace treaty with Japan. The Australian Government was more willing to sign if some American guarantee could be obtained against the consequences of a revived and militarized Japan.

Whatever the power of persuasion of other arguments used by The Australian Government to obtain an American commitment in

¹C. Hartley Grattan, The United States and the Southwest Pacific, p. 213.

²Ibid.

the western or southern Pacific, it seemed this was the most successful.³ The strong Australian wish for such a commitment appeared to the United States as a possibility to break Australian resistance to the treaty. To the Australian Government, an American guarantee against an aggressive Japan, in addition to its intrinsic value, was a big step toward a wider collective system in the Pacific.

The alliance with the United States took formal legal shape with the Security Treaty Between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand (ANZUS) in 1951. It was the last major milestone of the period during which the Australians saw any future threat to their security as more likely to come from Japan than from any other quarter. The Australians had slowly and reluctantly been weaned by the United States from their accustomed view of Japan as the most likely enemy, but the Australians early adopted the view of Communist China as an alternative threat.

ANZUS

The ANZUS Pact was limited in membership and its obligations were more vague than many Australians desired. Article IV provided that:

Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the Parties would be dangerous

³US Dept of State, American Foreign Policy 1950-1955, Vol. 1, pp. 880-881.

to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.⁴

This watered down version of the corresponding article in the North Atlantic Pact was the result of careful drafting to avoid the same sort of debate in the American Congress which took place over the ratification of the NATO Pact. Monroe Doctrine phraseology was used.⁵ The Australians felt this did not make much practical difference.⁶

From the beginning, the ANZUS Pact meant different things to the United States and Australia. To the United States, the primary purpose of the treaty was to contain Communism. The Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, said:

To me, the most important single thing that the United States can do and the thing which is indispensable to hold the free world position, not only in Japan but in Korea, Formosa, and Indo-China is that we must adopt these positive policies and get away from the idea that this over-running of China by Soviet communism is a final last word as to what is going to happen to China.⁷

To Australian leaders, there was an essential relationship between the Japanese Peace Treaty and the ANZUS Pact. The Pact was clearly a reinsurance against Japan. Gradually the Australian Government moved closer to the American view of the functions of the pact. At the first ANZUS conference, in 1952, Mr. R. G. Casey, Minister of

⁴Ibid., p. 879.

⁵Ibid., p. 881.

⁶Richard G. Casey, Friends and Neighbors, pp. 81-82.

⁷US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Japanese Peace Treaty and Security Pacts, p. 47.

External Affairs, strongly supported the United States position that the purpose of the conference was to make a detailed survey of common interests and relationships in light of Communist China's threats to the security of the Pacific area.⁸

The ANZUS Pact came under fire from a large number of Australians when its provisions became known. Their argument was that no one could imagine Australia being attacked without an American interest being violated first. But it was easy to imagine the reverse, considering America's widespread commitments. To these persons, the pact was not an improvement of Australia's security, but an increase in risks.⁹

A more widespread criticism referred to the exclusion of Britain from the treaty. This did not appeal to the Empire loyalists, who saw in it a breakdown of the British Commonwealth rather than an increment of Australian security, nor to the advocates of collective security arrangement, who felt that the inclusion of Britain would have been a desirable enlargement of the treaty's scope. The government's answer was that Britain had been kept fully informed of the treaty negotiations and approved them; that the growing strength of the Anzac powers meant strengthening the Empire everywhere. The government denied any mutual exclusiveness of bonds with Great Britain and the United States. The obvious assumption underlying the government's position had been fundamental Anglo-American accord.

⁸Richard G. Casey, op. cit., p. 69.

⁹Werner Levi, Australia's Outlook on Asia, p. 96.

Any bilateral American-Australian arrangement was therefore considered merely as a regional contribution to a common Anglo-Saxon enterprise.¹⁰

To the United States, ANZUS remained, into 1953, an arrangement for a specific and limited function. The time did not seem ripe to pursue Article VIII of the treaty which implied a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area.¹¹ In September 1953, the ANZUS Council came to the conclusion that an enlargement of ANZUS membership would not contribute directly and materially to the strengthening of defense in the Pacific.¹²

Thus, as a consequence of World War II and the United States proven ability to defend the Australians against the Japanese, Australia's strategic reliance shifted naturally to the United States. The result of this shift was Australia's adherence to the ANZUS Pact. However, the shift represented no fundamental reorientation of policy. This remained as before--consistent reliance upon an effective major power for defense, but for defense against dangers that were increasingly conceived as likely to come from the mainland of Asia.

ANZUS was never regarded as sufficient for their purposes by the Australians. Though it brought the ties with the United States into formal order, it did not deal directly with the problems of

¹⁰Ibid., p. 97.

¹¹US Dept of State, op. cit., p. 879.

¹²Werner Levi, op. cit., p. 96.

Southeast Asia. The Australians were acutely aware that there was a gap in defense between Manila and Singapore, an area of fatal weakness in World War II, and equally important now with the shift of the designated aggressor to the continent of Asia. This was precisely the area where the pressure of Communist China was most likely to be felt. How to close the gap was a considerable problem. Many of the countries which should have been equally concerned with Australia to close it were skeptical of the American and Australian view that China was assumed to be imperialist in outlook.

As the Indo-China crisis reached its peak, Australia was faced with the need to reconcile seemingly incompatible policies to insure security. The Australians were keenly concerned to develop and maintain the best possible relations with the countries of Southeast Asia, but they did not feel that this meant that they must conform their own policies to Asian policies. Australians thought of themselves as a nation which was and would remain by force of geography a close neighbor of Asia, but, nevertheless, to be maintained as a state of Europe-American social and cultural character. Its policies should be, by preference, sympathetic to Asian states when this was possible. However, if Australian interests dictated support of policies not to Asian liking, the plunge had to be made. These considerations applied with particular force to the Australian desire for a comprehensive pact embracing themselves, New Zealand, all the Asian states, and the United

States, which they saw as necessary to protect their own integrity and the integrity of the Asian nations.¹³

Until the deterioration of the French position in Indo-China and the American acceptance to do something about it, no fruitful opportunity arose to discuss a collective security pact with the United States. It was only after the Indo-China problem was taken to Geneva and solved there that the pact the Australians wanted became a real possibility.¹⁴

The Geneva Conference ended in July 1954. There was no illusion on Australia's part that the compromises reached there would allow for a permanent relaxation of tensions in Southeast Asia. The aim of the Australians was a collective security treaty. The willingness of the United States to commit herself in Southeast Asia could, under no circumstances, be sacrificed. Five days after the end of the Geneva Conference, Australia announced a sweeping revision of her defense plans. She took the unprecedented step (for her) of announcing, in advance, her readiness to accept military commitments in support of a Southeast Asia treaty organization.¹⁵ For the first time in her history, Australia was prepared to commit her forces abroad in peacetime for her own protection.¹⁶

¹³C. Hartley Grattan, op. cit., p. 222.

¹⁴US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, pp. 11-12.

¹⁵Richard G. Casey, op. cit., pp. 106-107.

¹⁶US Dept of State, op. cit., p. 915.

SEATO

The SEATO Pact was a very different document from what the Australians had envisioned as a collective defense treaty.¹⁷ The primary weakness lay in its limited membership.¹⁸ The SEATO umbrella was extended precariously to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, an unstable area dependent on Western military aid. Burma remained unconvinced of the value of the pact as a defense against communism. India opposed declaring a kind of Monroe Doctrine unilaterally over the countries of Southeast Asia. The relative weakness of Thailand and the Philippines, and Britain's geographical remoteness as well as her heavy commitments elsewhere meant that the only effective force to deter aggression or resist it would be American. The treaty had carried the American commitment in the western Pacific further than ANZUS, and it did bring Britain more firmly into the area. However, the lack of "teeth" meant that it added little to Southeast Asian or Australian security. It fell short of Australia's hopes to close the Singapore-Manila gap in her defenses by an effective regional security pact.¹⁹ The dramatic bid to commit Australian troops in advance of the signature of the treaty had failed to pin down the United States to a firm military agreement at Manila. Australian attempts to set up a headquarters staff to coordinate

¹⁷US Dept of State, op. cit., pp. 912-916.

¹⁸Norman Harper, "Australia and Regional Pacts 1950-1957," Australian Outlook, Vol. 12, Mar. 1958, p. 13.

¹⁹Ibid.

the SEATO forces was unacceptable to the United States.²⁰ The failure to agree on concrete measures for military collaboration arose primarily from a divergence of strategic priorities between Washington and Canberra. American interests in Southeast Asia and in the South Pacific were basically peripheral. The primary purpose of advanced outposts on Asian soil was to strengthen the Alaska-Manila defense perimeter which was the outer bastion for the defense of the west coast of the United States.

For the Australians, British defense lines to the Far East had become increasingly tenuous with the evacuation of Suez and Indian independence. Singapore had become a defense bastion for Malaya instead of being a springboard for the defense of the Commonwealth east of Singapore. The Singapore-Manila gap was an awkward no-man's land into which Australia was anxious to press the United States. For Australia, the whole region was central to her defense.

Despite its disappointments, the Australian Government has expressed its confidence in the ANZUS and SEATO Pacts in the years since their formalization. The pacts represented no change in her basic defense policy which remained to make an adequate contribution to the military effort of powerful allies. She continued to avoid the necessity for independent military action.

²⁰US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, pp. 16-17.

In 1957, in announcing the result of a major review of defense policy, the Australian Prime Minister said that the government believed that a major war would almost certainly lead to mutual destruction through the use of nuclear weapons. He went on to express the conviction that as this consideration would persuade the Communist powers not to embark on global war, it would increase the temptation to engage in limited wars. It was of the greatest importance to Australia therefore that the free countries of Southeast Asia should not fall one by one to communist aggression. He went on to say that security in the area must therefore be a collective concept. "We cannot stand alone," he said, "and therefore we stand in good company in SEATO, in ANZUS, and in ANZAM."²¹

In 1959, the Australian Defense Minister restated the government's concept of Australia's place in a collective defense in the cold war: "The primary aim of our defense effort should therefore be the continual improvement of our ability to react promptly and effectively with our allies to meet limited war situations."²²

CAPACITY FOR INDEPENDENT ACTION

From 1959 until 1963, no official statement on defense indicated any change in Australia's confident reliance on her allies, or in the belief that there would be no call for independent action on

²¹Australia, Department of External Affairs, Current Notes on International Affairs, Vol. 28, Apr. 1957, p. 320.

²²"The World View from Canberra," The Round Table, No. 218, Dec. 1963, p. 44.

her part. In his defense review of May 22, 1963, however, the Prime Minister made a notable change. After speaking of the uncertainties of Laos, the acute problem in South Vietnam, the conflicts which existed over the creation of Malaysia, and, most significantly, the events concerning West New Guinea, he said, "We will defend these territories (Papua and New Guinea) as though they were part of our mainland; there must be no mistake about that." The word "Indonesia" does not appear anywhere in the Prime Minister's statement, but there is, from Australia's point of view, only one possible local threat to those Australian territories. It is from Indonesia, with whom they now have a common land frontier since the takeover of West New Guinea from the Dutch. The Prime Minister went on to announce an increase in defense expenditures and concluded his review with this revealing statement:

Such forces will provide a significant and welcome addition to any allied effort required in our area of strategic concern, but they will do more in that they will provide a capacity for independent action to meet the shock of any emergency with which we may in the future find ourselves faced.²³

The conclusion to be drawn from these words is that the Australian Government has decided that Australia may have to defend some vital interests which are not necessarily shared by her great allies, and that she may have to do so alone, at least until the progress of events compels allied intervention. This has never been accepted before by Australia.

²³Australia, Department of External Affairs, Current Notes on International Affairs, Vol. 34, May 1963, p. 87.

If this interpretation is correct, it is a notable change in defense policy. The change is the consequence of events over several preceding years. Foremost is the withdrawal of British authority from the Far East. Since the establishment of Malaysia, Britain has no remaining territorial responsibility in East Asia except for Hong Kong. She has a responsibility for Malaysia under a defense treaty. Her continued use of the naval base at Singapore now depends on treaty rights. Meanwhile, European affairs continue to pre-occupy the British as they have done since the end of World War II.

The United States is fully occupied in the Pacific with trying to contain the aggressiveness of Communist China, to sustain South Vietnam, to preserve the status quo of Laos, and to maintain the independence of Thailand. These are heavy responsibilities. The United States may not be sympathetic to viewpoints which do not directly serve the main purpose.

Since the end of World War II, it has seemed sufficient to the Australian Government to maintain only the minimal forces and to keep the American shield in front of Australia. Such a statement may appear contradictory to actions taken by the Australian Government. Time and a succession of crises saw Australia's military flag scattered over Southeast Asia. In the mid-1950's Australia sent an infantry battalion and a squadron of bombers to Malaya, where they remain today. By the Fall of 1964, in addition to the ground and air units in Malaya, Australia had a fighter squadron in Thailand, military instructors and an air transport unit in South

Vietnam, army engineers in Malaysian Borneo, and two destroyers on constant duty in Southeast Asian waters.

All this suggests a capability and an intention to reinforce which simply did not exist. The goods were all in the shop window. The announced buildup of Australia's military forces stemmed from this fact. The military power that could be projected by Australia was enough to get her in trouble, but not enough to extricate her should trouble come.

The Prime Minister's statement appears to show some uncertainty about the military support Australia would get in certain military contingencies. It does not appear unreasonable to assume that the Australians, aware of the global commitments of its primary ally, have come to the belief that larger Australian commitments would have to be undertaken and discharged before substantial outside help would be forthcoming. Australia would have to be involved in a "pretty big scrape" before she could expect substantial support under the provisions of ANZUS. Her military forces would have to be increased to meet this criterion. In short, the availability of Australian arms would help to insure Australia military support from her principal ally.

CHAPTER 6

EVOLUTION--ASSET OR LIABILITY TO THE US

Until halfway through the Second World War, Australia's defense policy was very much a product of her early history. Her defense thinking had been nurtured within the overall pattern of British strategic defense. As a natural corollary, and because of her deep concern over developments in Europe, she supported the United Kingdom in two world wars.

The unhappy events following the entry of Japan into World War II shattered the old concept that strategic defense could be left to the Royal Navy. Australia's primary reliance on Britain was shown to be a policy not viable when the British were involved in a life and death struggle in Europe.

American forces were able to hold and then turn the Japanese advance, and as American power developed, the attack was carried back through the islands of the Southwest Pacific to the Japanese mainland. By the end of the war, Australians had formed an appreciation of the immense strength that the United States was able to exert in Australia's area of primary strategic interest.

The experience of World War II caused the Australian Government to make a series of decisions which, while political in themselves, constituted the basis of the evolution of her defense policy. Australia recognized and accepted that British power in the Pacific was inadequate to the task confronting it. There was no visible chance that it could be built up to any useful level in

the predictable future. An idea and a fact about Australia's defense with which the Australians had lived for generations had suddenly lost all vitality. Australians concluded that this required Australia to act as a nation to insure her own survival, regardless of the violence that might appear to be done to ancient loyalties. She placed her national survival above the previously acknowledged duty to sustain military decisions taken by and in London. Australia openly sought the closest relations with the United States as the Pacific nation which possessed the power to insure Australia's survival. Australia's postwar search for regional security arrangements was, in reality, powered by her determination to legalize and formalize a claim to United States military power as a substitute for that with which she had lived for a century.

It may be pointed out that the foregoing course of events did not constitute a revolution in Australian defense policy. The policy remained, in essence, dependence on a major power to act as guarantor of Australia's security. But it was an evolution. Australia, staunchest supporter of the Empire and Commonwealth, was the first to seek a major source of her security outside the Empire and the Commonwealth. ANZUS, the principal vehicle by which Australia achieved her new security guarantee, not only did not include the mother country, but excluded Britain from becoming a signatory power.

The SEATO treaty was neither a change nor a further evolution of Australia's defense policy. To Australians, it was complimentary to ANZUS. ANZUS contained the stated intention of the United States

to come to the aid of Australia in the event of an attack on her metropolitan territory, island territories under her jurisdiction, her armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific. But nowhere was there mention of Southeast Asia, an area Australia viewed as being of crucial strategic importance to her. The purpose of the SEATO treaty, as envisioned by the United States, was to associate as many nations as possible in the defense of Southeast Asia against both overt and covert communist aggression. To the Australians, insofar as the United States was committed under SEATO, it was committed to physical operations on the mainland of Southeast Asia. While a protocol to the treaty limited the United States commitment to responding to communist aggression, this made very little difference to the Australians. They envisioned no other kind. To Australian eyes, the United States was now not only committed to the defense of Australia, but to the defense of an area of mainland Asia considered critical to Australia's security.

Thus, even though both ANZUS and SEATO had certain shortcomings from their point of view, the Australians were generally pleased. They had accomplished the principal objective of postwar defense policy which was to engage the United States as fully as possible in the direct defense of Australia and in the general defense of Southeast Asia.

It would appear, to this point, that the postwar arrangements between the two countries offered no particular advantage to the United States apart from the general advantage that any friendship offers over hostility. The contribution that the United States

can make to Australia's security is obvious, but every transaction must be viewed as being mutually advantageous to the parties concerned. The question is: What does the United States gain from its alliance with Australia?

There was yet another phase in the evolution of Australia's defense policy which, when associated with a decision previously taken by the Australian Government, holds the main answer to the foregoing question.

To assist in insuring that SEATO would come to fruition with its involvement of the United States in Southeast Asia, the Australians, as pointed out in chapter 5, took the unprecedented step of announcing their readiness to commit military forces in support of such a treaty. For the first time, Australia was prepared to commit her forces abroad in peacetime for her own protection. At the time, this indicated more a willingness than a capability. Australia had very little in the way of military forces to deploy. But the importance here lies in the decision, not the implementation.

In 1963, the Prime Minister announced the latest phase in the evolution of Australia's defense policy when he described a significant increase in the defense budget and then associated the increase with a capacity for independent action. When this buildup of military force, sufficient to provide a capacity for independent action, is viewed in conjunction with a willingness to deploy those forces within an area of strategic importance to the United States, it can be fairly said that such an event constitutes a happening of considerable importance to the United States. This is especially true

when the country concerned is, in the whole wide area from Bombay to Tokyo, the only state absolutely stable, resolutely western, and capable of providing a modern base for modern defense.

Oddly, the United States accrues benefits both from Australia's effort to increase her strength, and from her relative military weakness.

In the first instance, the United States benefits from the pure increase in military power because any such increase by an ally contributes to the overall strength of the Free World. Further, if and when Australia is called upon to honor fully her treaty commitments, she will be better able to do so with military power in being. Finally, to the extent that Australia increases her military capabilities, by that much more is she a producer of security, and by that much less is she a consumer.

Perhaps, in the final analysis, it is Australia's overall weakness that provides the most benefit to the United States. Conditioned by her experiences of World War II, and faced still by the dilemmas of location and small population, Australians see a danger in being just one more distant country whose security is guaranteed by America.

It is true that from the American point of view, the Southwest Pacific has historically been a peripheral, not a central concern, in the context of the Pacific, let alone in a global perspective. Australian writers on relations with the United States warn their countrymen that they are still today only a peripheral interest and concern to the Americans. They point out that the impact of

the United States around the world has increased since World War II and allege that the Southwest Pacific has simply received its roughly proportionate share of that increase. They point out that American interests are global and Australia is only one of over forty nations with whom the United States is allied. They suggest that Australia not be misled into overestimating the position of their area in the American scale of interest by assuming that since the United States bulks large in their eyes, they must bulk large in American eyes.

Such warnings cannot help but give rise, unconsciously perhaps, to a fear that at sometime, somewhere, an Australian claim on American military resources may be subordinated, at least initially, to other of the global responsibilities of the United States. It is not difficult to visualize such thinking as supporting, at least in part, Australia's announced decision to develop a "capacity for independent action to meet the initial shock of any emergency with which we may in the future find ourselves faced."

If there is going to be an alliance between Australia and the United States, it is illogical for Australia to expect protection in some respects and not cooperate with the United States in others. From Australia's vantage point, the value of aligning herself with the United States is to heighten American concern for Australia's own security interests in the region. What better way to do this than to prove to the United States that Australia is an indisputably excellent ally and that she is pulling her weight in the security system? If American concern for Australia can be likened to an

insurance policy which Australia might someday wish to cash in, such actions might well be considered as insurance premiums. As these premiums are paid, US policies toward East and Southeast Asia are assisted--perhaps made slightly more palatable--by being carried out in conjunction with smaller powers located in the region.

The situation in South Vietnam demonstrates the insurance premium concept. American troops are not in Vietnam for the purpose of protecting Australia, but Australia is actively supporting a major military undertaking of the major guarantor of her security in an area held to be of vital importance to that guarantor. In aiding the US, Australia is attempting to demonstrate that she is an excellent ally, and that she is pulling her weight in the security system. These are the ingredients of the insurance premium. Basic decisions taken by Australia during the evolution of her defense policy will, when they are fully implemented, allow these payments to be increased.

Not so directly related, but indicative of the importance to the United States of decisions taken by Australia during the evolution of her defense policy, are certain other Australian actions. These can be particularly related to decisions taken during the formulation of the SEATO treaty. Australia deployed elements of her Air Force to Thailand during the 1962 crisis. She has had a battalion in Malaya since 1955. In 1964, she stationed units of all services in and around Malaysian Borneo. These actions were all of some importance to the United States in the general area of Southeast Asia.

Just as the insurance premium concept springs basically from Australia's overall weakness and, in so doing, benefits the United States, so is there another way by which the United States may benefit from that weakness. If a relatively weak nation to whose defense a major power is committed can equate an attack upon herself as an attack upon the major power, she has then the highest possible assurance that the major power will come to her defense in a prompt and timely manner. United States facilities and/or forces on Australian soil would provide such a catalyst for Australia. Thus, the overall weakness of Australia could provide the basis for Australian accession to any such US request, the reasoning being that such arrangements would tend to involve the US more directly in the event of an attack upon Australia.

Finally, it remains to highlight the actions which were set in motion by the last phase in the evolution of Australia's defense policy--to achieve a capacity for independent action. Based on the assumption that the United States benefits from having an ally in the South Pacific capable of making more than a token contribution to the common effort and to its own defense, what is happening in Australia must be a source of satisfaction to the United States.

A summary of the main actions taken by Australia follows:

ARMY:¹ The regular army will be built up from a strength of 22,750 to 33,000 men by December 1966. Selective compulsory service

¹Australia, News and Information Bureau, Australia in Facts and Figures, No. 84, p. 9.

has been introduced. In order to provide at least twelve months of effective service in a unit, a total period of two years full-time duty has been prescribed. The organization of the army will be reviewed to provide for expansion of the field forces and high priority logistic units. Major acceleration in army equipment purchases has been approved including low-level antiaircraft weapons, air-transportable armored fighting vehicles, new artillery weapons, and combat surveillance equipment.

NAVY:² Three modern guided missile destroyers are being obtained from the United States. Four OBERON class submarines are being purchased from Britain. Four new antisubmarine frigates are being built in Australia. The aircraft carrier MELBOURNE is to be refitted and modernized for ASW purposes.

AIR FORCE:³ To modernize the RAAF, the Australian Government has ordered a total of one hundred Mirage jets from France and twenty-four F-111A aircraft from the United States.

In the Western Pacific, when one begins to count the politically stable areas with a democratic government, people friendly to America, and generally sympathetic to the causes the United States supports, Australia appears early on the list.

Given the evolution that has taken place with respect to Australia's defense policy and her apparent intention to prepare

²Australia, Bureau of Census and Statistics, Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 49, 1963, p. 1198.

³"Australia: An Ally Threatened Once Again," Washington Report, 30 Aug. 1965, p. 3.

herself to more fully carry her weight in the security system, it appears profitable for the United States to look with far closer attention to the uses of Australia as an ally. All too often the strategic position of the United States in Southeast Asia is assessed by Americans without any reference to Australia. We have not yet intensively explored the full meaning of Australia as a full associate in the Western Pacific. As Secretary of State Rusk said of ANZUS on May 9, 1962: "No defensive alliance was ever more firmly anchored in the solid realities of common interest, common ideals, and mutual confidence."⁴

Wilmer R. Lochrie
WILMER R. LOCHRIE
Lt Col Arty

⁴Dean Rusk, as quoted by Thomas B. Millar, "Australia and the American Alliance," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVII, No. 2, Summer 1964, p. 158.

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